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The Compassion of Zarathustra: Nietzsche on Sympathy and Strength 
Michael L. Frazer 
 
Contemporary moral and political discourse, across the ideological spectrum, regularly 
celebrates sentiments of sympathy or compassion.
1 Most canonical philosophers would take 
issue with this current vogue for shared suffering; Friedrich Nietzsche is far from unique in this 
regard. Indeed, Nietzsche acknowledges that the “overestimation of and predilection for 
compassion [des Mitleidens] on the part of modern philosophers is something new: hitherto 
philosophers have been at one as to the worthlessness of compassion. I name only Plato, 
Spinoza, La Rochefocauld and Kant…” (GM Preface 5, p. 455).
2 With many such philosophers, 
however, compassion is ignored, downplayed, or written-off more than it is actively opposed, 
often lumped together with all other strong emotions as an irrational “passion” to be subdued by 
“reason.” 
Yet Nietzsche was hardly an opponent of the non-rational passions as such,
3 and his 
critique of compassion is singular in both its extent and its vehemence. Indeed, the revaluation of 
compassion is one of the central themes, if not the central theme, in Nietzsche’s immoralist 
ethics. In addressing the value of morality, Nietzsche explains, he “had to come to terms almost 
exclusively” with his “great teacher Schopenhauer” (GM Preface 5, p. 455), and Schopenhauer’s 
ethics are perhaps the most thorough philosophical defense of a pure Mitleids-Moral—an 
altruistic moral system motivated entirely by compassion. Nietzsche’s critique of compassion, 
moreover, is central not only to his almost oedipal struggle with his “great teacher,” but also to 
his futile struggle to purge the sympathetic sentiments from his own tormented soul.
4 For 
contemporary political theorists looking for grounds for rejecting the current celebration of    
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compassion in American politics and culture, Nietzsche’s philosophy might therefore seem a 
very promising place to turn.
5 
Nietzsche’s critique of compassion, however, cannot be of any help to us today until 
interpreters of Nietzsche make clear what exactly this critique involves. As recently as 1990, 
Henry Staten observed that while “the question of pity is never long out of sight in Nietzsche’s 
texts… this question plays no significant role in any of the commentaries on Nietzsche that I 
know.”
6 In the decade and a half since Staten wrote, this gap in Nietzsche scholarship has begun 
to be filled, and Nietzsche’s views on compassion are now analyzed at least in passing in many 
discussions of the author’s thought.
7  For most current commentators, the challenge is one of 
puzzling out the source of Nietzsche’s opposition to a sentiment so many of us regard favorably; 
their many and varied answers to this interpretive riddle will be cited throughout this essay as the 
occasion warrants. Given their focus on the question of why Nietzsche is so opposed to 
compassion, however, most commentators today fail to question whether Nietzsche’s position on 
the sentiment is best understood as one of straightforward “opposition” at all.
8 It is the purpose 
of this essay to challenge the received wisdom on this topic, and suggest that Nietzsche’s critique 
of compassion should not be understood as merely critical. To the contrary, the active 
endorsement of one’s own compassionate feelings is characteristic of the highest specimens of 
humanity which Nietzsche’s philosophy celebrates.  
This is not to suggest that Nietzsche provides his interpreters with a systematic table of 
virtues and vices according to which compassion could fall neatly into the column of virtue, any 
more than it could neatly fit into the column of vice. “I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid 
them,” Nietzsche writes. “The will to system is a lack of integrity” (GD “Maxims and Arrows” 
26, p. 470). In order to make sense of Nietzsche’s position on compassion, however, some sense    
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must be made of Nietzschean ethics as a whole, and hence of the foundation on which Nietzsche 
builds his specific normative conclusions regarding compassion. The first section of this essay 
will therefore briefly stake out what I hope is a plausible position between those who deny that 
Nietzsche was engaged in anything resembling traditional ethical philosophy and those who see 
Nietzsche as nothing more than a rather heterodox Platonist or Aristotelian.  
To be sure, my position in this first section must remain provisional, but my task is only 
to set the stage for an engagement with Nietzsche’s alleged condemnation of compassion, which 
will take up the second, longer part of the essay. This latter section will show that an 
endorsement of one’s compassion is actually a natural outgrowth of Nietzsche’s immoralist 
ethics—that the noblest disciples of Zarathustra must actively embrace the sympathetic 
sentiments inevitably present in their own psyches. This interpretive claim should give pause to 
contemporary theorists who might seek to enlist Nietzsche as an obvious, unproblematic ally in 
their battle against the ubiquitous rhetoric of compassion today. 
 
I. On Nietzschean Ethics 
1. Ethics, Not Genealogy 
One currently widespread stream of interpretation, begun by Gilles Deleuze and 
popularized by Michel Foucault, insists that Nietzsche had no interest in traditional ethics, but 
was instead primarily engaged in a groundbreaking new form of social inquiry by the name of 
“genealogy.”
9 This understanding of “genealogy” as the keystone of Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
however, has not withstood critical scrutiny.
10  This is not to say that Nietzsche is uninterested in 
the historical origins of our moral evaluations. Yet addressing these origins is a mere preliminary 
to answering the question that really interests Nietzsche, the question of “what value do they    
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themselves [these judgments] possess?” (GM Preface 3, p. 453).
11 “Genealogy” alone is hardly 
sufficient for addressing this all-important question; Nietzsche insists that “the inquiry into the 
origins of our evaluations and tables of the good is in absolutely no way identical with a critique 
of them, as is so often believed” (WM 254, p. 148).
12 If he is to move from facts to values, to 
make claims of a normative rather than a merely historical sort, Nietzsche needs an independent 
foundation for such claims.  
Something resembling the traditional ethical appeal to an objective teleology embedded 
in human nature is the most likely candidate for such a foundation. Yet it is precisely such an 
objective ethics which those who describe Nietzsche as a “genealogist” insist that the author 
cannot provide. This impossibility is often attributed to Nietszche’s “perspectivism”—the 
doctrine that an objective ethics, like any objective knowledge, is unattainable because “there is 
only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’” (GM III:12, p. 555).
13 Yet 
perspectivism obviously does not rule out all critique or revaluation of our moral evaluations. 
Alexander Nehamas, for one, argues that the great crime of slave morality, the fundamental 
reason for its low valuation by Nietzsche, is a crime against perspectivism itself. The Christian 
morality of the weak, he claims, seeks “to conceal and to deny its own interpretive status” by 
maintaining that it is true and authoritative for all, weak and strong alike, rather than a 
perspectival expression of the needs of the weak alone.
14  
Admittedly, the rejection of perspectivism is one of the many crimes that slave morality 
commits, and for which Nietzsche berates it. But this is certainly not Nietzsche’s greatest 
objection to slave morality. To the contrary, his greatest objection to slave morality is precisely 
that it is the morality of slaves—of the weak and the sick. Its universalism and absolutism, in 
turn, are objectionable, not because of their philosophical objectivism as such, but because they    
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are tools by which the weak succeeded in poisoning the strong and healthy, robbing them of their 
natural strength and health. Luckily, however, this is “merely one type of human morality beside 
which other types, above all higher moralities, are, or ought to be, possible” (JGB V:202, p. 
305).   
Nietzsche’s demand for a new, higher morality can be harmonized with his perspectivism 
when one acknowledges, following Nehamas, that Nietzsche’s perspectivism need not imply 
ethical relativism.
 15  Specifically, perspectivism is entirely compatible with the idea that certain 
perspectives are better than others. Nietzsche captures this idea by rejecting interpretations of the 
world that represent “only provisional perspectives, perspectives… from some nook, perhaps 
from below, frog perspectives, as it were” (JGB I:2, p. 200). Nietzsche can even take this one 
step farther and consider that there might be one privileged perspective which is better, not just 
than some others, but better than all others—not in the sense of being more objective or giving a 
truer picture of things, but in the sense of being more urgent or more commanding. Such a 
perspective would be the single best perspective for human beings to take on the world; its view 
on existence would be ethically authoritative for creatures such as ourselves.  
 
2. Ethics from the Perspective of Life 
The discovery of such an ethically authoritative perspective is the hallmark of 
Nietzsche’s mature philosophy; he refers to it repeatedly as “the perspective of life.” While 
Nietzsche undoubtedly holds that there is “no limit to the ways in which the world can be 
interpreted,” he also maintains that, when seen from the all-important perspective of life, every 
interpretation can itself be interpreted as “a symptom of growth or decline” (WM 600, p. 326). 
The question which dominates every aspect of  Nietzsche’s writings on virtually all human    
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matters is thus to what extent the phenomenon in question “is life-promoting, life-preserving, 
species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating” (JGB I:4, p. 201). It is from the perspective 
of life that Nietzsche weighs the uses and disadvantages of history in the untimely meditation of 
that title, for the sake of life that he revaluates the value of truth itself at the beginning of Beyond 
Good and Evil, and it is from this same perspective that Nietzsche determines the worth of 
competing moral systems in On the Genealogy of Morals and elsewhere. 
 “For what reason does Nietzsche privilege this specific perspective,” Henry Staten asks, 
“and to privilege it so massively as an interpretation of the entire history of his culture? Is it 
because he thinks it’s true? Not if he’s really a perspectivist. What then?”
16 At times, strength 
and health in life are presented as goals to which every animal, humanity included, strives 
instinctively (e.g., GM III:7, p. 543). The valuations which result are “more clearly” understood 
as “physiological demands for the preservation of the preservation of a certain type of life” (JGB 
1:3, p. 201). Yet Nietzsche does not hold that the perspective of life is the one which, as a matter 
of fact, we all happen to take; to the contrary, many professional valuators (prophets, priests, 
philosophers, etc.) have assumed an opposite perspective. Nietzsche must therefore argue that 
there is something wrong with those who refuse to evaluate values in terms of their uses and 
disadvantages for life. How can we make sense of this “wrongness,” and of the apparently 
unconditional “ought” which it implies, in a manner consistent with Nietzsche’s work as a 
whole? 
The answer to our question lies in the possibility, famously suggested by Martin 
Heidegger, that Nietzsche may not actually be “nearly so subversive as he himself was wont to 
pose.”
17 Heidegger, for one, argues that Nietzsche succeeds only in “inverting” Platonic 
metaphysics, never truly “overcoming” it.
18 Peter Berkowitz makes an argument analogous to    
 
 
Page 7 
Heidegger’s concerning Nietzsche’s ethics specifically; Nietzsche here emerges as more of an 
inverted Aristotle than an inverted Plato, analyzing human life in terms of natural potentialities 
that establish natural virtues or excellences necessary for the good life.
19 Berkowitz thus 
adamantly rejects Nehamas’s contention that Nietzsche’s perspectivism prohibits grading 
“people and views along a single scale;”
20 there is, from the perspective of life, precisely such a 
single scale of excellence—an order of rank in terms of natural, vital virtue (arete in the 
Aristotelian sense)—the excellence of the natural aristocracy as established by the teleology of 
human life. For this reason, John Rawls classifies Nietzsche alongside Aristotle as a 
“perfectionist.”
21  
Nietzsche’s conception of human perfection, of course, is rather different from Aristotle’s 
ideal of virtuous moderation. The excellent man under Nietzsche’s ethics seeks “not virtue but 
fitness (Renaissance virtue, virtù, virtue that is moraline-free).” (AC 2, p. 570).  In rejecting the 
content of Aristotelian ethics, however, Nietzsche insists that he has not rejected its categories, 
most notably that of virtue itself.
22 To the contrary, he has done them a great service; “I have 
imparted to virtue a new charm—the charm of something forbidden,” Nietzsche proudly notes. 
“It appears as a vice” (WM 328, p. 179). Now in keeping with our vital instincts, this new and 
improved version of virtue has a natural appeal. “One would make a little boy stare if one asked 
him: ‘Would you like to become virtuous?’” goes one charming account of this appeal, “but he 
will open his eyes wide if asked: ‘Would you like to become stronger than your friends?’” (WM 
918, p. 485).  
  
3. Value Creation and the Limits of Nietzchean Ethics    
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The interpretation of Nietzsche outlined in the previous section notwithstanding, it is 
impossible to deny that there are many strikingly relativist passages in Nietzsche’s ethical 
writings which, even as they make use of the traditional concept of virtue, might be taken to 
prohibit us from considering any specific virtue the product of natural, Aristotelian teleology.
23 
“A thousand goals have there been so far,” Zarathustra says, “for there have been a thousand 
peoples.” Yet, unlike today’s cultural relativists, Zarathustra does not stop here. “The one goal is 
still lacking,” he says. “Humanity still has no goal. But tell me, my brothers, if humanity still 
lacks a goal—is humanity itself not still lacking too?” (Z I “On the Thousand and One Goals,” p. 
172) If all goods and goals are individually or culturally relative, however, what could ever be 
the one telos for all of humanity? 
Nothing other, Nietzsche would answer, than the telos of setting tele—of positing goals, 
of esteeming and condemning, in short, of creating values. “No people could live without first 
esteeming,” he writes (Z I “On the Thousand and One Goals,” p. 170). In this way, “life itself 
forces us to posit values; life itself values through us when we posit values” (GD “Morality as 
Anti-Nature” 5, p. 490). Indeed, such valuing is, for Nietzsche, the very essence of life. “Is not 
living—estimating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different?” (JGB I:9, p. 
205). Thus, from the authoritative perspective of life, “esteeming itself is of all esteemed things 
the most estimable treasure.” (Z I “On the Thousand and One Goals,” p. 171). Nietzsche explains 
that life, as the will to power, is healthy insofar as it can successfully reach out and incorporate 
others into one’s own projects. Yet violent coercion of an inferior can hardly achieve this goal; 
“while a crude injury done him certainly demonstrates our power over him, it at the same time 
estranges his will from us even more—and thus makes him less easy to subjugate” (WM 769, pp. 
403-404). Only by legislating values, values which are then fully internalized by the wills of    
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others, can one get around the futility of wielding more widely-recognized forms of great power. 
Thus, Nietzsche writes, “he who determines values and directs the will of millennia by giving 
direction to the highest natures is the highest man” (WM 999, p. 519).  
The telos of value-creation is the crux of Nietzsche’s ethical theory. Any formally 
Aristotelian moral philosophy gains substance and content only through the essential 
potentialities it places at the center of human nature. According to Nietzsche, man is not (as 
Aristotle would have it) the essentially rational, or the essentially political, animal but instead 
“the calculating [or ‘valuating,’ as Kaufmann translates it] animal” (GM II:8, p. 506). Or, as 
Nietzsche puts it in Beyond Good and Evil, man is the “as yet undetermined animal,” the creature 
that must make its way in the world by choosing its own goals, and hence its own values (JGB 
III:62, p. 264). The unique form of this telos allows Nietzsche to come close to overcoming, 
rather than merely overturning, Aristotelian ethics. If the nature of man is to have an 
undetermined nature, if the natural end of human life is the selection of one’s own ends, then it is 
impossible to produce a single, universally valid table of virtues and vices of the sort familiar 
from the middle books of the Nicomachean Ethics. To borrow a phrase from Staten, the telos of 
value-creation as the ultimate sign of health is a “telos which is the undoing of all teleology.”
24 
The unthinking celebration of health and strength, of master morality, or even of value 
creation itself, is thus an evasion of man’s highest responsibility and hence a sign of weakness. 
This is why Nietzsche writes that the strongest today are not found simply adhering to the old-
fashioned morality of good and bad, as opposed to the now-common morality of good and evil. 
Instead, “today there is perhaps no more decisive mark of a “higher nature… than that of 
being… a genuine battleground of these opposed values” (GM I:16, p. 488). Nietzsche ultimately 
cannot tell those of us strong enough to choose our own values to choose one particular moral    
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code. All he can do is describe the sort of choices characteristic of such noble individuals—
choices that shine forth as signs of their natural strength. Most obviously, the strong who have 
not been poisoned by slave morality or who have overcome this poisoning will normally tend to 
value themselves; value creation is at its most basic an act of self-affirmation. The naturally 
noble call the traits of character bound up with their psychic strength by the names of the 
virtues.
25 For a physician of the soul such as Nietzsche, these traits are best understood as 
diagnostic signs of psychic health; the positive self-evaluation of the strong themselves turns 
these positive symptoms into moral virtues.  
The choices of the truly noble must remain fully their own and cannot be entirely 
predicted prior to any given act of value creation. This puts severe limitations on the ethicist’s 
work as a physician of the soul. Nietzsche writes: 
The popular medical formulation of morality that goes back to Ariston of Chios, “virtue 
is the health of the soul,” would have to be changed to become useful, at least to read 
“your virtue is the health of your soul.” For there is no health as such… Even the 
determination of what is healthy for your body depends on your goal, your horizon, your 
energies, your impulses… In one person, of course, this health could look like its 
opposite in another person (FW 3:120, pp. 176-177).
26 
The result of Nietzsche’s understanding of psychic health is that “the very same 
symptoms could point to decline and to strength” (WM 110, p. 69). Nietzschean ethics thus 
emerges as a particularly difficult form of intellectual inquiry; the signs of natural health and 
strength which mark the value-creating choices of the natural aristocracy must be carefully sifted 
from the signs of decadence and decline which mark the almost identical pseudo-choices of the 
weak and ill. This leads to a strange doubling throughout Nietzsche’s ethics, as the same    
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phenomena appear at one moment as signs of health, and, in an ever-so-subtly different form, as 
symptoms of weakness. There is a philosophical asceticism of which Nietzsche approves and a 
priestly one of which he does not; a skepticism which he condemns and another which he 
endorses; and, perhaps most famously, a pessimism of weakness and a pessimism of strength.
27 
We should not, then, expect a simple or straightforward categorization of the sympathetic 
sentiments. To the contrary, we should expect to find closely related emotions in both categories: 
a compassion of weakness endorsed by slave morality and a compassion of strength embraced by 
the natural aristocracy.
28 
 
II. The Case of Compassion 
1.  More Dangerous Than Any Vice 
In discussing what can be translated into English alternately as “pity,” “sympathy” or 
“compassion,” Nietzsche almost always uses variations on the German term Mitleid—literally, 
“suffering-with”—and only rarely uses alternative German terms such as Mitempfinden, 
Mitgefühl (both “feeling-with”) or Sympathie.  Nietzsche was never entirely satisfied with the 
vocabulary available in German to describe the phenomenon in question—he complains “how 
coarsely does language assault with its one word [i.e., Mitleid] so polyphonous a being!”—but it 
is the vocabulary he uses nonetheless (MR 2:133, p. 133). The English word “compassion,” from 
the Latin for “suffering with” (com-passion), or “sympathy” from the Greek for the same (sym-
pathos), would be appropriate translations of Mitleid. In virtually all English-language 
translations of and commentaries on Nietzsche, however, variations on the term “pity” are 
chosen instead.
 29 Yet “pity,” which has an entirely different etymology, often carries negative 
connotations of superficiality and condescension which Mitleid lacks.
30 Perhaps much of the    
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subtlety of Nietzsche’s position on Mitleid has been overlooked in the English-speaking world at 
least in part because of the widespread translation of the term as “pity.”
31 
Regardless of how Mitleid is translated, however, Nietzsche’s condemnation of the 
sentiment could hardly appear more straightforward to a superficial reader. As has been 
established, Nietzsche evaluates any human phenomenon as a symptom of strength or weakness, 
a sign of the advancement of life or of its decline. His question concerning compassion is thus, 
“Is it, above all else, good for you yourselves to be compassionate [mitleidige] men?” (FW 
IV:338, p. 269). The answer seems obvious. “Compassion [Mitleiden],” Nietzsche writes, 
“insofar as it really causes suffering [Leiden]—and this is here our only point of view—is a 
weakness” (MR II:134, p. 134). “One is deprived of strength when one feels compassion 
[mitleidet],” he explains. “Compassion makes suffering contagious,” and therefore “stands 
opposed to the tonic emotions which heighten our vitality” (AC 7, pp. 572-573).
32 Yet this line 
of argument, taken in isolation, would categorize compassion one weakness among many others, 
little different from the suffering which it leads one to share, and Nietzsche’s critique of the 
sentiment seems to go much further.
 33 “The virtue of which Schopenhauer still taught that it is 
the supreme, the only virtue, and the basis of all virtues,” Nietzsche wrote in his notes, “precisely 
compassion [Mitleiden] I recognized as more dangerous than any vice” (WM 54, p. 34). How is 
this unique status of compassion to be understood? 
Perhaps we should turn our attention from the subject of compassion to its object. 
Nietzsche does ask whether such an emotion is good, not only for those who feel it, but also “for 
those who suffer [den Leidenen]” (FW IV:338, p. 269). His answer here, too, is that compassion 
is of no value; “if one does good merely out of compassion [Mitleid], it is oneself one really does 
good to, and not the other” (WM 368, p. 199). To be sure, one’s painful sympathy may be    
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soothed, but the object of this sympathy has been shamed by the condescension charity implies, 
and, even more importantly, been deprived of the opportunity to build real strength from his own 
efforts to overcome his suffering. Indeed, the potential value of suffering as a challenge to be met 
head-on, a spur to greatness, and a test of one’s mettle is a central theme in Nietzsche’s ethics. 
“It almost determines the order of rank,” he repeatedly insists, “how profoundly human beings 
can suffer” (JGB IX:270. p. 410). “To those of my disciples who have any concern for me,” 
Nietzsche therefore reasons, “I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities… I 
have no compassion [Mitleid] for them, because I wish them the only thing that can prove today 
whether one is worth anything or not” (WM 910, p. 481).
34  
These are all strong arguments against compassion, to be sure. But Nietzsche insists that 
there is still “a more important one… Quite in general, compassion [das Mitleiden] crosses the 
law of development, which is the law of selection. It preserves what is ripe for destruction, it 
defends those who have been disinherited and condemned by life” (AC 7, p. 573).
35 The eugenic 
argument against compassion is a direct extension of the medical nature of Nietzschean ethics. 
“Life itself recognizes no solidarity, no ‘equal rights,’ between the healthy and the degenerate 
parts of an organism: one must excise the latter—or the whole will perish,” Nietzsche explains. 
As a result, “Compassion for [Mitleiden mit] decadents, equal rights for the ill-constituted—that 
would be the profoundest immorality; that would be antinature itself as morality!” (WM 734, p. 
389). The physician to humanity, in order to save it from its degenerate parts, must therefore first 
play physician to the individual psyche, for it is the compassion in the individual that feeds the 
degeneracy in the collective. “To be physicians here, to wield the scalpel here,” Nietzsche 
explains, “that is our part; that is our love of man; that is how we are philosophers” (AC 7, p. 
574).    
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Even this eugenic view, however, fails to capture the full danger of compassion, for it 
portrays the weak and sickly who are its objects as mere passive recipients of aid. To the 
contrary, compassion is actively wielded as a weapon in the hands of the weak. For the most 
degenerate of the degenerate, it is the one weapon they have left, the one last strength which 
shows that they are still alive as manifestations of the will to power. They therefore wield 
compassion with relish. When the weak beg the strong for sympathy, “the compassion [Das 
Mitleiden] which these [the strong] then express is a consolation for the weak and suffering, 
inasmuch as it shows them that, all their weakness notwithstanding, they possess at any rate one 
power: the power to hurt” (MAM I:50, p. 39). The result is not only the objective degeneration 
of humanity over the generations, but also a subjective sense of shame on the part of those who 
remain strong. Full power over another, remember, is control over his values. The ultimate 
victory of the slaves over the masters thus comes when they have “succeeded in poisoning the 
consciences of the fortunate with their own misery, with all misery, so that one day the fortunate 
begin to be ashamed of their good fortune and perhaps say to one another: ‘it is disgraceful to be 
fortunate: there is too much misery’” (GM III:14, p. 560). 
According to Nietzsche, the recent development of Schopenhauer’s Mitleids-Moral is 
evidence that slave morality is finally coming to self-consciousness, stripping itself of its 
theological underpinnings and realizing that it is founded on nothing more (or, for that matter, 
nothing less) than the coercive power of compassion, the one great weapon of the weak. 
Mitleids-Moral hence has the advantage of a certain clear-headedness, a certain lack of illusions 
about itself not present in earlier (e.g., Christian) forms of slave morality. But it is slave morality 
all the same and, from the perspective of life, deserves the fiercest ethical opposition.   
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2. Compassion versus Compassion 
Nietzsche is undoubtedly filled with rage at those who bring about the degeneration of 
humanity by obtaining the compassion of their natural superiors, rage seemingly justified from 
the perspective of life. Nonetheless, his precise feelings toward compassion take a rather 
surprising form. “Anyone… who approached this almost deliberate degeneration and atrophy of 
man represented by the Christian European… would surely have to cry out in wrath, in 
compassion [mit Mitleid], in horror: ‘O you dolts, you presumptuous, compassionate 
[mitleidigen] dolts, what have you done!” (JGB III: 62, p. 265). Nietzsche, in other words, reacts 
to the sight of humanity diminishing itself through compassion with compassion, albeit a “higher 
and more farsighted compassion [Mitleiden]” than the Christian and quasi-post-Christian 
moralists’ foolish hatred of sheer suffering. “Thus,” Nietzsche concludes, “it is compassion 
versus compassion [Mitleid also gegen Mitleid]” (JGB VII:225, pp. 343-344). Given all of 
Nietzsche’s arguments outlined above, however, how can he possibly endorse compassion in any 
form? Can there really be a compassion of strength? 
One might answer in the negative, while finding some appropriately noble disposition 
that could perform an analogous function in the case of the strong and pitiless. Such a sentiment 
would lead the naturally healthy aristocrat to the service of a degenerating humanity without 
dragging him into the great cesspool of human suffering. To the contrary, it would grow 
naturally from the very health and power which keeps the nobleman at such a distance from his 
miserable inferiors. If Nietzsche, at times, still speaks of this sentiment as a sort of compassion, 
he is using the word very loosely, and primarily for ironic effect. And the best candidate for such 
a noble replacement for compassion is the “gift-giving virtue” discussed throughout Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. In the prologue of that epic work, our hero at first tells the saint that he has left his    
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lofty seclusion out of a (compassionate?) love of lesser men. Quickly, however, Zarathustra 
corrects himself. “Did I speak of love? I bring men a gift” (Z Prologue:2, p. 123). Nor is the gift-
giving virtue a mere quirk of Nietzsche’s protagonist; on the contrary, it is integral to the 
author’s conception of health and strength. “Those poor in life, the weak, impoverish life,” he 
writes. “Those rich in life, the strong, enrich it. The first are parasites of life; the second give 
presents to it” (WM 48, p. 30). If you are naturally, vitally noble you will inevitably “force all 
things to and into yourself that they may flow back out of your well as the gifts of your love” (Z 
I “On the Gift-Giving Virtue,” 1 p. 187).  
The gift-giving virtue, however, is by no means a form of compassion, let alone a 
compassion of strength. Instead, it is compassion’s usurper and replacement. “The noble human 
being… helps the unfortunate, but not, or almost not, from compassion [nicht oder fast nicht aus 
Mitleid], but prompted more by an urge begotten by excess of power” (JGB IX:260, p. 395). Yet 
one should not overlook or underestimate that “fast.”
36 To suggest that Nietzsche is discussing 
the gift-giving virtue when he approves of compassion does violence to his insistence that his 
“higher” Mitleid still deserves that otherwise lowly appellation. A genuinely compassionate form 
of compassion is, for Nietzsche, still actively present in the noble soul. 
 
3. A Weakness of the Strong? 
Our interpretive puzzle becomes especially salient when one focuses on Nietzsche’s 
pseudo-scriptural epic Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Generally speaking, the eponymous hero of that 
work is a paragon of strength and health. Yet Zarathustra shamefacedly admits quite early on that 
he is unable to live up to his own vital ethics in one crucial regard. “If I must be compassionate 
[mitleidig],” Zarathustra says, “at least I do not want it known; and if I am compassionate, it is    
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preferably from a distance… Therefore I wash my hand when it helped the sufferer; therefore I 
wipe even my soul.” (Z II: “On the Compassionate,” pp. 200-201). Zarathustra’s struggle with 
unwanted compassion takes center stage in Part IV, and the work climaxes with the prophet’s 
ultimate triumph. Yet the author feels no need to burden his protagonist with other weaknesses or 
infirmities. Why would Zarathustra be plagued by compassion exclusively? 
Compassion may be a weakness, but it is a distinctive sentiment of the otherwise 
relatively strong. To be subject to infection by another’s suffering one’s own condition must 
initially be superior to his, so a feeling of compassion signals that one ranks higher than this 
suffering other. Although the degenerating effect of sympathetic suffering may soon drag one 
down to the sufferer’s lowly condition, we must not discount the vitalizing effect of the initial 
realization of one’s superiority. And it is precisely because those at risk of experiencing 
compassion are relatively strong that this emotion is such a powerful weapon in the hands of 
their inferiors. The “Jesuitism of mediocrity, which instinctively works at the annihilation of the 
uncommon man and tries to break every bent bow, or, preferably, to unbend it” is armed 
exclusively with this sentiment. “Unbending with familiar compassion, that is the characteristic 
art of Jesuitism which has always known how to introduce itself as a religion of compassion [des 
Mitleidens]” (JGB VI: 206, p. 316). Compassion is thus the weapon such Jesuits use in their 
attempt to destroy Zarathustra, whose Achilles’ heel is his soft heart. 
Nietzsche realizes these implications of his analysis, but is also quick to deflate them. 
The experience of compassion demonstrates only that sympathizers rank a single step higher 
than the objects of their sentiments. Compassionate individuals’ absolute standing may 
nonetheless remain quite low, as it must be if they exult in the sudden realization of their 
superiority to mere sufferers. “Compassion [Mitleid] is the most agreeable feeling among those    
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who have little pride and no prospects of great conquests,” Nietzsche writes; “for them easy 
prey—and that is what all who suffer [jeder Leidende] are—is enchanting. Compassion is 
praised as the virtue of prostitutes” (FW I:13, p. 88). For those of middling rank, compassion can 
thus be a means of turning one’s attention from the debilitating sight of one’s superiors to the 
more pleasing sight of one’s inferiors. “As long as Prometheus feels compassion [Mitleid] for 
men and sacrifices himself for them, he is happy and great,” runs Nietzsche’s parable on this 
subject; “but when he becomes envious of Zeus and the homage paid to him by mortals, then he 
suffers” (FW III:251, p. 216). Surely, however, compassion is not to be found in, let alone found 
pleasant by, he who stands at the very top of the order of rank. 
Zarathustra, however, has heard otherwise. “Thus spoke the devil to me once,” he 
recounts. “‘God too has his hell: that is his love of man.’ And most recently I heard him say this: 
‘God is dead; God has been killed by his compassion [Mitleiden] for man’” (Z II “On the 
Compassionate,” pp. 202). This possibility intrigues Zarathustra immensely, and the last, retired 
pope later confirms the tale (Z IV “Retired,” pp. 372-373). A compassion of the strong, however, 
is very far from a compassion of strength if it ultimately debilitates and kills formerly great gods. 
A true compassion of strength would not be the distinctive symptom of the imminent demise of 
the once strong, but an expression of life and power successfully at work in the very moment of 
compassion.  
 
4. Knowledge, Suffering and Strength of Imagination    
That a true compassion of strength may indeed exist is suggested by the vital category of 
the Dionysian—a category that, though its contents are fluid and often obscure, Nietzsche clearly 
endorses wholeheartedly. In his earliest work, still largely under the spell of Schopenhauer,    
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Nietzsche describes the Dionysian as involving a break through the principium individuationis, 
culminating in ecstatic unity and the sharing of all emotions, suffering included (See GT 2, p. 
40). Although one might argue that the significance of the Dionysian changes over the course of 
Nietzsche’s career, the element of universal unity and compassion remains constant throughout. 
In a note from June 1888, mere months before his final breakdown, Nietzsche writes that “the 
word ‘Dionysian’ means: an urge to unity, a reaching out beyond personality… the great 
pantheistic sharing of joy and suffering [Mitfreudigkeit und Mitledigkeit]” (WM 1050, p. 539).
37 
There is, Nietzsche recognizes, a specific sort of strength at work when one breaks 
through the principium individuations to share in another’s suffering. Specifically, the strength of 
one’s imagination allows for a bridging of the divide between individuals and the picturing of 
another’s suffering from his own perspective. Without such imaginative strength, compassion is 
impossible. “The great lack of imagination [Phantasie] from which [the mediocre man] suffers 
means that he is unable to feel his way into [hineinfühlen, i.e., empathize with] other beings,” 
Nietzsche observes, “and thus he participates as little as possible in their fortunes and sufferings 
[Leiden]” (MAM I:33, p. 29). The compassionate man has an imaginative intelligence, and hence 
a kind of knowledge, which the unimaginative, ignorant man lacks.  “That the other suffers 
[leidet] has to be learned,” Nietzsche insists, and this is a lesson that seems inseparable from 
compassion.  
Or is compassion perhaps separable from this lesson, perhaps even opposed to it? “In a 
man devoted to knowledge,” Nietzsche writes, “compassion [Mitleiden] seems almost ridiculous, 
like delicate hands on a Cyclops” (JGB IV:171, p. 262). Nietzsche even suggests that 
compassion, at least as it is usually experienced, acts against knowledge of suffering by 
providing a false, overly generalized picture of another’s woe. “It is the very essence of the    
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emotion of compassion [der mitleidigen Affection] that it strips away from the suffering of others 
whatever is distinctively personal,” he explains. “When people try to benefit someone in distress, 
the intellectual frivolity with which those moved by compassion [der Mitleidige] assume the role 
of fate is for the most part outrageous; one simply knows nothing of the whole inner sequence 
and intricacies that are distress for me or for you” (FW IV:338, p. 269).
38 
In contrast to this compassion which “gets things wrong,” Nietzsche paints a rather 
mysterious alternative which somehow “gets things right.” This is a “more manly brother of 
compassion [männlicheren Bruder des Mitleidens]” (MR I:78, p. 79) Nietzsche writes; it is “a 
feeling for which I find no name accurate” (WM 367 pp. 198-199). At one point, this unnamable 
Übermitleid is identified with the “species of suffering” experienced only when “the genius of 
ability and of knowledge is amalgamated with moral genius in the same individual.” Such a man 
has “an extra- and supra-personal sensibility attuned to a nation, to mankind, to a whole culture, 
to all suffering existence [allem leidenden Dasein], which acquires its value through its 
connection with very difficult and remote forms of knowledge.” In contrast to such a sensibility, 
“compassion itself [Mitleid an sich] remains of very little value” (MAM I:157, p. 84).  
At another point, Nietzsche insists the sensibility he is advocating is actually not a sort of 
suffering, not a sort of Leid or Mitleid, at all. It is not compassion, he writes, “that opens the 
gates to the most distant and strange types of being and culture” but rather a kind of empathy that 
“does not ‘suffer with’ [nicht ‘mitleidet’] but on the contrary takes delight in a hundred things 
that… led people to suffer.” This manlier brother of compassion is a sort of “feeling-with and 
knowing-with [Mitempfindung und… Mitwissen]” which is nonetheless “far from being… 
compassionate [mitleidig]” (MR II:113, p. 113). In today’s English terminology, it is a joyous, 
sometimes cruel empathy that pitilessly penetrates into another’s experience of suffering without    
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ever coming to feel this suffering itself. This empathy may emotionally overwhelm those who 
experience it, but Nietzsche insists that their delightful pain is not compassionate. “[E]ven when 
we are shaken by the sight of suffering and moved to tears,” he writes, “we do not by any means 
for that reason feel like helping” (WM 119, pp. 72-73).  
It is a strange form of delight, however, which shakes one by the sight of suffering and 
brings one to tears. Such tears look suspiciously like the sharing of suffering, a sharing essential 
to real knowledge of another’s woe. Admittedly, philosophers today still speak of an empathetic 
sadism that delights in the suffering of another, not because it lacks full knowledge or experience 
of this suffering, or even despite such knowledge, but precisely through its sweet savor. Indeed, 
the initial observation of such cruel empathy is even credited to Nietzsche himself.
39 Sadistic 
empathy, however, seems unable to truly access the sufferings of others, entirely numb as it is to 
their pain’s very painfulness. As Rousseau says of another’s suffering, “to see it without feeling 
it is not to know it.”
40 The truth of another’s pain thus seems epistemologically inaccessible 
without an experience that itself qualifies as suffering, and hence as Mitleid or compassion.  
To be sure, compassion as we actually experience it does not itself always get things 
right. The pain of another can be misfelt and hence misunderstood. Yet any emotion which does 
successfully accesses another’s suffering will surely qualify as compassion. Indeed, the more 
accurate a picture of another’s suffering a sentiment provides, the more fully does it deserve the 
name of compassion. “What Nietzsche names with… other names,” Staten reasons, “is therefore 
true Mitleid, the deep and genuine version of that which Mitleid usually names.”
41 Nietzsche 
himself concedes as such. “Anyone who, in intercourse with men, does not occasionally glisten 
in all the colors of distress,” he admits, “green and gray with disgust, satiety, sympathy    
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[Mitgefühl], gloominess and loneliness, is certainly not a man of elevated tastes… he was not 
made, he was not predestined, for knowledge” (JGB II:26, p. 227).
42 
 
 
 
5. Compassion as Test  
Although Nietzsche acknowledges that the truly knowledgeable must also be 
compassionate, he is also famous for arguing that the truth is often of only dubious advantage to 
life. It is thus not clear that the knowledge that compassion brings is worth having, at least from 
the perspective of life. In evaluating compassion, Nietzsche is thus faced with a paradox: Insofar 
as a man has great strength of imagination and intellect, he will accurately feel the sufferings of 
others. Yet insofar as a man feels the sufferings of others, he may turn against his life and health. 
Weakened by his compassion, he may even be brought down to the level of those whose 
sufferings he witnesses. In this way, “compassion [Mitleiden] is the deepest abyss: as deeply as 
man sees into life, he also sees into suffering” (Z III: “On the Vision and the Riddle,” 1, pp. 269). 
The paradox is especially pressing for someone who seeks knowledge of that specific 
form of human suffering that Nietzsche describes as the object of his greatest interest: the 
degeneration of humanity and of its highest specimens. “The more a psychologist—a born and 
inevitable psychologist and unriddler of souls—applies himself to the more exquisite cases and 
human beings,” Nietzsche writes, “the greater becomes the danger that he might suffocate from 
compassion [am Mitleiden]… For the corruption, the ruination of the higher men, of the souls of 
a stronger type, is the rule: it is terrible to have such a rule always before one’s eyes” (JGB 
IX:269, p. 407). It is precisely this sort of depressing, perhaps even debilitating, knowledge of    
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higher men, however, that is central to Nietzsche’s ethical inquiry. The final part of Nietzsche’s 
masterpiece Thus Spoke Zarathustra consists almost entirely in case studies of these near-greats. 
How could one understand the higher men without sharing in their characteristic misery, 
experiencing compassion, and hence being suffocated by sympathetic suffering? 
This problem is solved when we understand the Mitleid inevitably faced by the 
imaginative unriddler of human souls as a test of strength akin to the Leiden Nietzsche wishes for 
his disciples. Just as the ability to withstand personal suffering is crucial for establishing an 
individual’s true rank, so too could one “determine value and rank in accordance with how much 
and how many things one could bear to take upon oneself, how far one could extend one’s 
responsibility” (JGB VI:212, p. 327) with regard to the suffering of others. In this way, the life-
promoting aspect in compassion, as Nietzsche puts it with regard to his own case, “does not 
consist in feeling with [mitzufühlen] men how they are, but in enduring that I feel with them” 
(EH “Why I Am So Wise” 8, p. 689). If compassion is indeed inseparable from a certain kind of 
knowledge—knowledge of the truth of others’ suffering—then the test of compassion is part of a 
larger series of trials through which the noble philosopher must pass. “How much truth does a 
spirit endure, how much truth does it dare? More and more that became for me the real measure 
of value” Nietzsche writes. “Error… is not blindness; error is cowardice” (EH Preface 3, p. 674). 
The challenge regarding the specific truth of others’ suffering is to feel compassion for 
them, and to feel it with full force, but “not to remain stuck” to it (JGB II:41, p. 242). Mitgefühl 
is thus included alongside courage, insight and solitude as one of the four virtues which a noble 
man must “master”—not only in the sense of possessing these virtues, but also in the sense of 
putting them to the service of life’s further advancement (JGB IX:284, p. 416). “This is the 
exception,” Nietzsche explains, “where, against my wont and conviction, I side with the    
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‘selfless’ drives: here they work in the service of self-love, of self-discipline” (EH “Why I Am So 
Clever 8, p. 710). It is thus not actually compassion itself, but rather “the overcoming of 
compassion [Überwindung des Mitleids]” which counts “among the noble virtues” (EH “Why I 
Am So Wise” 4, p. 684). 
At one point in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche presents a vivid portrait of the self-
loving, self-disciplined nobleman, the man for whom (and only for whom) there can be a 
genuine compassion of strength: 
A man who says, “I like this, I take this for my own and want to protect it and defend it 
against anybody;” a man who is able to manage something, to carry out a resolution, to 
remain faithful to a thought, to hold a woman, to punish and prostrate one who presumed 
too much; a man who has his wrath and his sword and to whom the weak, the suffering, 
the hard pressed, and the animals like to fall and belong by nature, in short a man who is 
by nature a master—when such a man has compassion [Mitleiden], well, this compassion 
has value [dies Mitledien hat Wert]” (JGB IX:293, p. 420).
43 
As vivid as it is, however, this is a rather odd and incomplete portrait. How exactly does 
such a nobleman, naturally a master of others, come to master himself and his own compassion, 
hence giving it value? Certainly not by purging the emotion from his psyche entirely, for then 
one cannot say that the natural master still “has” compassion, and that this compassion “has” 
value. Fortunately, Nietzsche provides another, fuller portrait of a great man wrestling with his 
own compassion:  the title character in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, who is simultaneously the 
imperfect embodiment of Nietzsche’s ethical ideal and the author’s alter ego. Upon examination, 
the figure of Zarathustra implies a rather different approach to shared suffering than “the 
overcoming of compassion” might suggest.    
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6. Zarathustra’s Ultimate Triumph 
“As ‘Zarathustra’s temptation,’” Nietzsche recounts, “I invented a situation in which a 
great cry of distress reaches him, as compassion [das Mitleiden] tries to attack him as a final sin 
that would entice him away from himself” (EH “Why I Am So Wise” 4, p. 684).
44 This 
temptation takes center stage in the final quarter of the work, with a soothsayer’s explicit 
announcement that compassion has been “saved up” for our protagonist as his last great vice (Z 
IV “The Cry of Distress, p. 354). “To remain the master at this point,” Nietzsche explains, “to 
keep the eminence of one’s task undefiled… that is the test, perhaps the ultimate test, which a 
Zarathustra must pass—his real proof of strength” (EH “Why I Am So Wise” 4, p. 684). 
Nietzsche’s hero is thus sent off for a trying and terrible day of encounters with the “higher 
men,” precisely the sort of near-misses which are so likely to choke a psychologist with 
compassion. Compassion naturally poses the greatest test for the strong with regard to this most 
painful of all forms of the emotion, compassion “for higher men into whose rare torture and 
helplessness some accident allowed us to look” (JGB II:41, p. 242). 
Though each higher man deserves full attention, representing as they do the ripest fruit of 
Nietzsche’s studies of the almost-great, for our purposes we must focus instead on Zarathustra’s 
reaction to them. And of all the emotions toward the higher men that Zarathustra struggles to 
master, perhaps most interesting are those from his encounter with the “ugliest man.” Even as 
this grotesque figure is about to praise Zarathustra for his relative lack of compassion—a sign of 
natural strength so radically different from the weakness of the pitying, pitiful mob, who madly 
call their compassion “virtue itself”—our hero falls prey to precisely such vulgar feelings. 
Zarathustra experiences compassion like a blow from a great enemy, described with an    
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appropriately Homeric simile. Upon seeing the ugliest man’s unbearable face, “Compassion 
[Das Mitleiden] seized him, and he sank down all at once, like an oak tree that has long resisted 
many woodcutters—heavily, suddenly, terrifying even those who wanted to fell it” (Z IV “The 
Ugliest Man,” p. 376). His interlocutor, in turn, sees that Zarathustra knows the truth of 
compassion’s ethical danger. As the ugliest man remarks, paraphrasing our protagonist’s 
prophecy from Part I (Z I “On the Pitying,” p. 202 ), “When you say, ‘From compassion [dem 
Mitleiden], a great cloud approaches; beware, O men!’… O Zarathustra, how well you seem to 
understand storm signs.” Such an abstract realization, however, is not enough; as an all-too-often 
object of all-too-human sympathy can recognize all too well, the prophet is not yet strong enough 
to internalize his own teaching. “Warn yourself also against your compassion!” the ugliest man 
thus implores Zarathustra (Z IV “The Ugliest Man,” p. 378).  
It is only the following morning, as the book comes to its dramatic close, that Zarathustra 
achieves victory in his great test. The moment of this triumph, certainly one of the literary 
highpoints of Nietzsche’s oeuvre, is worth quoting in its entirety:  
“O you higher men, it was your distress that this old soothsayer prophesied to me 
yesterday morning. To your distress he wanted to seduce and tempt me. ‘O Zarathustra,’ 
he said to me, ‘I come to seduce you to your final sin.’ To my final sin?” shouted 
Zarathustra, and he laughed angrily at his own words; “what was it that was saved up for 
my final sin?” And once more Zarathustra became absorbed in himself, and he sat down 
again on the big stone and reflected. Suddenly he jumped up. 
“Compassion! Compassion for the higher men!” he cried out, and his face 
changed to bronze. “Well now! That—has had its time! My suffering and my compassion 
[Mein Leid und mein Mitleiden]—what does it matter? Am I striving after happiness? I    
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am striving after creation [Werk]! Well now! The lion came, my children are near, 
Zarathustra has ripened, my hour has come: This is my morning, my day is breaking: rise 
now, rise, thou great noon!” 
Thus spoke Zarathustra, and he left his cave, glowing and strong as a morning sun 
that comes out of dark mountains. (Z IV “The Sign,” p. 439). 
What, exactly, constitutes this revitalizing victory? Inspired by the passage in Ecce Homo 
which insists that Zarathustra must “overcome” compassion in order to carry on the hard work of 
creation, Martha Nussbaum interprets the “climax” of Zarathustra’s “long spiritual development” 
as coming only when “he finally gets rid of his pity.”
45 Stanley Rosen agrees, arguing that in this 
moment of “purgation” Zarathustra is finally “cured of pity for the higher men.”
46 Robert Pippin 
specifically sees the “sign” of the lion’s appearance (symbolic of strength) as persuading 
Zarathustra that he is at last free of any sympathetic feelings for these specimens of failed 
greatness. With this sign, Zarathustra makes a “mysterious, sudden decision that he no longer 
pities them.”
47  
This conventional interpretation of the close of Nietzsche’s epic, however, is surely 
incorrect. A close examination of the passage in question reveals that Zarathustra never 
“overcomes” his compassion in the sense of ridding himself of it once and for all. There is no 
indication that our hero will fail to experience compassion upon further encounters with 
suffering, or even that he has ceased to feel compassion for the higher men. Achieving “mastery” 
over a virtue or sentiment, remember, necessarily implies retaining it in one’s psyche, not 
abandoning it. Rather than ridding himself of all sympathetic sentiments once and for all, 
Zarathustra affirms his feelings for the higher men as having had their “time” as an essential 
component of his destiny. Compassion may cause him real misery, but, when properly    
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harnessed, it helps rather than hinders Zarathustra’s creativity. Indeed, as tightly bound as 
sympathetic feelings are with the possession of knowledge and the faculty of imagination, they 
are necessarily present in any creative psyche. Remembering, then, that the telos of human 
striving is not happiness but creation (more specifically value-creation), the experience of 
compassion is nothing to be regretted. 
While Rosen acknowledges that “the pitiful must be accepted as a natural part of human 
existence,” he nonetheless interprets Nietzsche to maintain that “it must also be destroyed in 
order for the creation of higher values that will themselves exclude or minimize pity by the 
imposition of a natural hardness that… is for Nietzsche the indispensable complement to the 
birth of a race of warrior-artists.”
48 Yet value-creation does not require the “destruction” of 
compassion; it requires affirmation of the imaginative strength which allows the wise to share 
suffering with the objects of their all-encompassing knowledge. A mere brute warrior may not 
need to experience compassion, but a warrior-artist and value-creator surely must, albeit without 
allowing this suffering to interfere with his work. Though the weak may be unable to withstand 
even the slightest pain, the strong and creative not only withstand their suffering and their 
sympathetic suffering—they positively embrace them. Such suffering is of no “matter” to them, 
for it is no hindrance in their creative task, only a hindrance to the pursuit of happiness 
undertaken by the “last man” and other such degenerates (See Z I Prologue 5, p. 129). 
Compassion, Zarathustra concludes, is an unbearable burden only for those who mistakenly 
believe the true goal of human existence to be contentment rather than creation. 
Elsewhere, speaking of his philosophical honesty, Nietzsche reasons that, despite this 
honesty’s regrettable aspects, “supposing that this is our virtue from which we cannot get away, 
we free spirits—well, let us work on it with all our malice and love and not weary of ‘perfecting’    
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ourselves in our virtue” (JGB VII:227, p. 345).
49 Zarathustra treats compassion similarly, 
realizing that sympathetic suffering is inseparable from his imaginative creativity, and then 
returning to his destined task with the glow of a healthy soul ready to use all his faculties—
including compassionate imagination—in pursuit of his chosen task.
50 This, remember, is how 
value-creation first appears, as a great self-affirmation on the part of the naturally noble (See GM 
I:2, p. 462). Such a value-creator seizes the right to call even his propensities for suffering—
including a propensity for the sympathetic suffering of Mitleid—by the name of virtue. The 
virtue so chosen will inevitably shine forth as a sign of his strength, and be put to service in the 
advancement of life.  
 
7. Nietzsche’s Warning 
Though my interpretation of Nietzsche’s position on compassion may be unconventional, 
the conviction that Nietzsche’s position remains relevant is not. Many, such as Nussbaum, have 
defended compassion against what they see as Nietzsche’s unrelenting critique; by refuting him, 
they hope to better understand our reasons for embracing the sentiment today.
51 Yet the 
temptation here is to misinterpret Nietzsche so as to render him easier dialectical prey. 
Nussbaum’s critic Weber, though sharing Nussbaum’s misreading of Nietzsche as a 
straightforward opponent of compassion, moves closer to a true understanding of Nietzsche’s 
position by considering that it might be basically correct. “In a world in which so many suffer 
while a small minority flourishes,” Weber acknowledges, “it is easy to invest all one’s energy… 
into the plight of those who suffer, and to lose sight of—perhaps even to develop a certain 
contempt for—the more privileged and… the realization of the highest human excellences.”
 52 
Although Weber doubts that these concerns will turn many today into opponents of compassion,    
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he remains convinced that Nietzsche’s description of “the pitfalls and pathologies” of the 
sympathetic sentiments serves as a “good warning” for all those who might overvalue these 
emotions.
53  
Weber, however, only captures half of Nietzsche’s warning. There is a second way in 
which the painful experience of compassion can threaten human excellence. Not only do we risk 
developing contempt for all but the suffering masses, but we also risk developing contempt for 
the compassion that forces us to suffer with them. The terrible experience of shared suffering 
might lead some of the would-be great on a futile quest to abolish human misery. Others, 
however, are likely to conclude that their sympathetic pain could be most efficiently relieved by 
extirpating the faculties responsible for it. When we do not hate the suffering of others, but only 
our own sharing of this suffering, we seek only to banish compassion from our own breasts. 
Doing so, however, requires us to shield ourselves from the troubling awareness of our fellows’ 
plight, to sever the imaginative and emotional bonds which connect us to others. It requires that 
we turn against our own strength of intelligence and imagination, that we sacrifice knowledge for 
ignorance by denying our insights into the human condition. Some of us might succeed in 
turning ourselves into such isolated, unthinking beings, but such individuals are not destined for 
creative achievement.  
By contrast, the natural philosopher, poet or psychologist—the born and inevitable 
unriddler of human souls—could no more destroy his own sense of compassion than he could 
abolish the human suffering which compassion compels him to share. A futile quest to extirpate 
his sympathetic sentiments would only turn such an individual against the world, against life, and 
against himself; in the end, it might even destroy him. Zarathustra does not pass the greatest test 
of his strength by purging compassion from his psyche. To the contrary, he affirms his painful    
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experience of the emotion as creativity-enhancing and life-promoting. In doing so, Nietzsche’s 
protagonist warns against those who unduly oppose compassion as well as those who unduly 
celebrate it. Both sides treat pain as something to be soothed away rather than harnessed for 
creative purposes; they differ only in whether the pain to be alleviated is our own or that of 
others. From the ethically authoritative perspective of life, both can be seen as opponents of 
human flourishing. 
Zarathustra’s success in embracing compassion, however, does not necessarily reflect 
such success on the part of his creator. Throughout his interpretation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
Pippin reminds us to keep careful track of an “irony” infusing Zarathustra’s teachings, an irony 
stemming from “a lack of identity between the self-understanding of a character and that of the 
author and, by virtue of that difference, a potential negative qualification of what is said or done 
by that character.”
54 While Zarathustra may have resolved the question of compassion by 
affirming his sympathetic sentiments, “there is no reason to think that the ironic distance 
between Zarathustra and Nietzsche has been overcome.”
55  
Yet the distinction between an author and his character need not privilege the real over 
the fictional person; the “potential negative qualification” might be better applied to what is said 
or done by the writer, not by his creation. Nietzsche may have crafted a great test and created a 
character capable of passing this test, without having sufficient strength to pass it himself.
56 
Indeed, Nietzsche repeatedly complains in his correspondence that “Schopenhauer’s 
‘compassion’ has always been the major source of problems in my life.” 
57 It has even been 
suggested that his hostility toward compassion may have played a role in Nietzsche’s ultimate 
destruction; the famous breakdown of 1889 has been interpreted by several of Nietzsche’s 
biographers as being brought on by an unbearable compassion with the lowliest of sufferers, a    
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horse being beaten by its driver.
58 In this way, Nietzsche might not only pronounce a warning 
about the life-denying dangers of excessive opposition to compassion; he might also serve as 
such a warning himself.  
Nietzsche was well aware that his general approach to ethics, together with his insightful 
evaluation of Mitleid, demanded that the noble soul embrace its own sympathetic sentiments. Yet 
Nietzsche was also aware that every great philosophy is “the personal confession of its author 
and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir” (JGB I:6, p. 203). Perhaps the greatest sin 
that Nietzsche confesses in his philosophy is a failure to make peace with a world filled with 
misery in which knowledge of the human condition is inseparable from compassionate suffering. 
Since his fierce denunciations of the undue celebration of compassion so overwhelmingly 
outnumber his denunciations of its undue rejection, Nietzsche appears to be a much more 
straightforward critic of shared suffering than his immoralist ethics warrants.
59  
Although Nietzsche may have lacked the fortitude to endure the pain of his tremendous 
compassion for others, this very compassion animated his greatest creative achievements, most 
notably the fourth part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The moving portraits of the higher men—not 
to mention the compelling account of Zarathustra’s long struggle to endure and ultimately 
embrace his sympathetic feelings for them—would have been impossible had the author lacked 
deep compassion for each and every one of his characters, as well as for their real-world models. 
Yet even as Thus Spoke Zarathustra remains an eloquent example of the creative achievements 
possible only through compassion, the anguish which allowed for its composition may have been 
too much for its author to bear.     
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I would like to thank Coral Celeste, George Kateb, Stanley Corngold, Stephen Macedo, Jeffrey 
Stout, Tracy Strong, Tamsin Shaw, Patrick Deneen, Casiano Hacker-Cordón, Amy Shuster, John 
Holzwarth, Alex Zakaras, Catherine Zuckert and the anonymous reviewers at The Review of 
Politics for their helpful comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented 
at the Princeton University Graduate Research Seminar in Political Theory and at the 2004 
meeting of the Western Political Science Association. 
1 The central place of compassion in our popular political discourse is well known; our most 
recent Democratic president famously trumpeted his ability to feel others’ pain, and his 
Republican replacement still assures us that his conservatism remains compassionate. This 
popular infatuation with compassion has also spread into academic moral and political theory. 
For an important example of a contemporary theorist of compassion—one who provides 
extensive references to other such theorists—see Martha Nussbaum, “Compassion: The Most 
Basic Social Emotion,” Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (1996): 27-58, and the corresponding 
chapters in Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 297-456.  
2 Whenever possible, all quotations from Nietzsche in English are from the translations by 
Walter Kaufmann, R. J. Hollingdale, or the two in collaboration. When necessary for the point at 
hand, however, I have either modified Kaufmann and Hollingdale’s translations (most notably by 
always changing the translation of Mitleid from “pity” to “compassion”) or quoted directly from 
the German original in the Colli/Montinari edition, available online through Intelex Past Masters 
at http://www.library.nlx.com/. I also consulted the 1930 edition of Nietzsche’s Werke published    
 
 
Page 34 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
by Alfred Kröner, Leipzig, as the collection of Nietzsche’s notes published under the title Der 
Wille zur Macht is not included in the Colli/Montinari edition in the edited form translated by 
Kaufmann. Nietzsche’s works will be cited parenthetically, along with section names or numbers 
and page numbers in their respective translations, according to the following standard system of 
abbreviations: 
GT: Geburt der Tragödie. (1872/1886) Translated by Kaufmann as The Birth of Tragedy in The 
Basic Writings of Nietzsche (New York: The Modern Library, 1966/1992), pp. 1-145. 
MAM: Menschliches, Allzumenschliches. (1878/1886). Translated by Hollingdale as Human, All 
Too Human (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).  
MR: Morgenröte. (1881). Translated by Hollingdale as Daybreak (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982). 
FW: Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft (1882/1887). Translated by Kaufmann as The Gay Science 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1974). 
Z:  Also Sprach Zarathustra. (1883-1885) Translated by Kaufmann as Thus Spoke Zarathustra in 
The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Penguin Books, 1954/1982), pp. 103-440. 
JGB: Jenseits von Gut und Böse (1886) Translated by Kaufmann as Beyond Good and Evil in 
Basic Writings, pp. 179-436. 
GM: Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887) Translated by Kaufmann as On the Genealogy of Morals 
in Basic Writings, pp. 437-600. 
EH: Ecce Homo (Written 1888, Published 1908). Translated by Kaufmann in Basic Writings, pp. 
655-800.   
GD: Götzendämmerung (1889) Translated by Kaufmann as Twilight of the Idols in The Portable 
Nietzsche, pp. 463-564.    
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AC: Der Antichrist (Written 1888, Published 1895) Translated by Kaufmann in The Portable 
Nietzsche, pp. 565-656. 
WM: Der Wille Zur Macht (Collected from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of 1863-1888, 1906) 
Translated by Kaufmann and Hollingdale as The Will to Power (New York: Vintage Books, 
1968). 
3 For more on Nietzsche as siding with Hume in the battle for domination between reason and 
passion, see Leslie Paul Thiele, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of 
Heroic Individualism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 56. 
4 Ruth Abbey similarly observes that Nietzsche’s critique of compassion can “be read as self-
critique in two ways: he is not just trying to deny this powerful strain in his own personality, but 
is also trying to purge himself of his past affinity with Schopenhauer” (Ruth Abbey, Nietzsche’s 
Middle Period [New York: Oxford University Press, 2000], p. 62). For the best general theory of 
oedipal struggle with one’s intellectual and artistic forbearers, see Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of 
Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). As Abbey notes, however, Bloom is 
incorrect to view Nietzsche as an author who “did not feel the chill of being darkened by a 
precursor’s shadow” (Bloom, p. 50; Abbey, p. 199). 
5 Given that compassion has only recently emerged as a central theme in our political rhetoric, 
the political-theoretical literature critiquing the sympathetic sentiments remains relatively small. 
Interestingly, given his reputation as a defender of pitié, Rousseau has been the touchstone for 
many of today’s academic critics of compassion. See, for example, Clifford Orwin, “Rousseau 
and the Discovery of Political Compassion,” in Clifford Orwin and Nathan Tarcov, eds., The 
Legacy of Rousseau (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 296-320 and Richard    
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Boyd, “Pity’s Pathologies Portrayed: Rousseau and the Limits of Democratic Compassion,” 
Political Theory 32:4 (August 2004): 519-546. 
6 Henry Staten, Nietzsche’s Voice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 1.  
7  For a brief but wide-ranging review of the recent literature on Nietzsche’s critique of 
compassion, see Abbey, p. 175. For one of the most extended discussions on the topic, which 
will serve as an important foil for my own views throughout this essay, see Martha C. 
Nussbaum, “Pity and Mercy: Nietzsche’s Stoicism” in Richard Schacht, ed.  Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1994): 139-147. Much of the material in this essay is re-used in 
Chapter 7 of Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought. 
8 Thiele (p. 152) is one exception to this general rule, but discusses Nietzsche’s qualified 
endorsement of compassion in only a few all-too-brief paragraphs; Thiele’s important, if under-
developed, insights will be cited in their appropriate context. Abbey’s chapter on the subtle 
evaluation of compassion in Nietzsche’s “middle period” (pp. 55-71) is another important 
exception to this rule. Yet while Abbey grants that in Nietzsche’s later works “some echoes of 
the more sensitive and nuanced portrayal of pity offered in the middle period” may remain, she 
argues that in these “shriller and more simplistic” texts “pity becomes a byword for many of the 
perils that Nietzsche identifies… rather than a mystery of the psyche to be unraveled with care 
and delicacy.” Abbey concludes that, as on a number of other subjects, the views on compassion 
that Nietzsche abandoned by1883 are superior to those advanced in his later works (Abbey pp. 
70-71, p. 156). While I agree with much of Abbey’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s writings from 
before 1883, I disagree with most of her characterizations of Nietzsche’s writings from after that 
year. The present essay will analyze Nietzsche’s mature position on compassion by drawing on    
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writings from throughout the 1880’s—including both works of the “middle period” at the 
beginning of that decade and the final period of productivity at the end of it, but focusing 
primarily on the three interrelated works of 1883-7 which are Nietzsche’s greatest legacy: Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals. This essay argues 
that the subtlety which Abbey describes as characteristic only of Nietzsche’s “middle period” 
position on compassion is in fact Nietzsche’s characteristic of his mature position on the subject 
simpliciter. That said, Abbey’s important insights, like Thiele’s, will be cited as appropriate. 
9 The first, classic statement of this view is Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962). 
Translated by Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), especially pp. 1-
3. It was made famous by Foucault’s 1971 essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy and History.” Reprinted 
widely in many languages, this piece may now be found most readily in the 1977 English 
translation by Daniel F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon in The Foucault Reader. Edited by Paul 
Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), pp. 76-100.  
10 Jacqueline Stevens, for example, has convincingly argued that Darwinian “genealogists of 
morals” such as Nietzsche’s estranged friend Paul Rée are the “worthless” opponents against 
which Nietzsche sets his own views in his self-described “polemic” On the Genealogy of Morals. 
See Jacqueline Stevens, “On the Morals of Genealogy,” Political Theory 31:4 (August 2003): 
558-588. (Nietzsche calls genealogists of morals “worthless” at GM II:4 p. 498.) The current 
secondary literature on Nietzsche’s alleged method of “genealogy” is, of course, far too vast to 
review here in its entirety; an excellent starting point are the essays collected in Schacht, ed., 
particularly those in Part II, pp. 251-468. 
11 As Nietzsche puts it a little later, “we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values 
themselves must be called into question—and for that there is needed a knowledge of the    
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conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed” (GM 
Preface 6, p. 456). 
12 This point is discussed at greater length in Raymond Geuss, “Nietzsche and Genealogy,” in 
Morality, Culture and History: Essays on German Philosophy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999): 1-28; see especially pp. 20-21. 
13 Deleuze, for one, argues that Nietzsche’s “perspectivism” demonstrates that “knowledge itself 
is an illusion; knowledge is an error, or worse, a falsification” (Deleuze, p. 90). 
14 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1985), p. 105. See also pp. 126-129, 214-217. 
15 See, for example, Ibid., p. 84. 
16 Staten, p. 6. In searching for an answer here, however, Staten readily admits that he is “not 
primarily interested in debating the cogency of Nietzsche’s doctrines” (p. 129)—that is, as I take 
it, with making philosophical sense of them. For a more philosophical take on these issues, see 
Raymond Geuss, “Nietzsche and Morality,” in Morality, Culture and History (op. cit): 167-198, 
especially pp. 181-185. 
17 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volumes I and II. Translated by David Farrell Krell (San 
Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1979/1984/1991), I:13, I:1, p. 4. 
18 Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead’” (1943). Collected in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Translated by William Lovitt (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1977), pp. 53-114. See p. 53 and p. 75. Heidegger later explains that “as a mere 
countermovement” Nietzsche’s worldview “necessarily remains, as does everything ‘anti,’ held 
fast in the essence of that over against which it moves” (p. 61).    
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19 Peter Berkowitz, Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1995); see pp. 96-99.  Stanley Rosen’s interpretation of Nietzsche is allied with that of 
Berkowitz, who clearly concurs with Rosen’s claim that commentators such as Delueze and 
Foucault, with their “emphasis on difference to the neglect of rank-ordering, and on the 
multiplicity of perspectives to the neglect of Nietzsche’s classification of these perspectives into 
a finite number of [ranked] types” have “led to a vulgarization of his [Nietzsche’s] teaching that 
is unfortunately typical of our time” (Stanley Rosen, The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995], p. 151). It is tempting to treat those 
who read Nietzsche primarily in terms of “genealogy” and “perspectivism” as “leftist,” and those 
who read Nietzsche along more traditional, Platonic or Aristotelian lines as “conservative,” but I 
have deliberately avoided such politically-loaded labels. 
20 Nehamas, p. 68. 
21 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1971/1999), p. 22. 
22 A convincing argument that Nietzsche is indeed a virtue ethicist in this sense can be found in 
Thomas H. Brobjer, “Nietzsche’s Affirmative Morality: An Ethics of Virtue,” Journal of 
Nietzsche Studies 26 (2003): 64-78. 
23 Consider the following relativist advice from Zarathustra:  
If you have a virtue and she is your virtue, then you have her in common with nobody. To 
be sure, you want to call her by name and pet her… And behold, now you have her name 
in common with the people and have become one of the people and herd with your 
virtue… May your virtue be too exalted for the familiarity of names… [Just say of her] 
‘This is my good; this I love; it pleases me wholly; thus alone do I want the good. I do not    
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want it as divine law; I do not want it as human statute and need… there is little prudence 
[that is, Aristotelian practical wisdom or phronesis] in it, and least of all the reason of all 
men. (Z I “Of Enjoying and Suffering the Passions,” p. 148). 
24 Staten, p. 169.  
25 See GM I:2, p. 462. Even the weaknesses of the otherwise strong may thus be called by the 
name of virtue. “One thing is needful,” Nietzsche writes. “To ‘give style’ to one’s character—a 
great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their 
nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason 
and even weaknesses delight the eye” (FW 4:290, p. 232). 
26 Nietzsche here goes on to observe that, even if we can determine what would constitute the 
health of a single individual, “the great question would still remain whether we can really 
dispense with illness… and whether... the will to health alone is not a prejudice, cowardice, and 
perhaps a bit of very subtle barbarism and backwardness” (FW 3:120, p. 177). Nietzsche himself 
is thus no unthinking celebrant of health and strength, even as he ultimately does embrace the 
perspective of life as ethically authoritative. 
27 For asceticism, see GM III. For skepticism, see, for example, JGB VI:208. It is hardly worth 
listing Nietzsche’s countless discussions of pessimism, but GT 7 is as good a place to begin as 
any. There are also many other examples of such doubling throughout Nietzsche’s corpus; to cite 
just one more example, see Zarathustra’s description of chastity as a virtue in some and a vice in 
others in Z I: “On Chastity,” pp. 166-167. 
28 Abbey argues that for the Nietzsche of the middle period “emotions and drives are not ruled 
out a priori… As a consequence, Nietzsche does not rule out a drive like pity; everything 
depends upon who is experiencing it, why and how, with whom and to what ends” (Abbey, pp.    
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69-7070). As was mentioned earlier, what Abbey holds true primarily of the middle-period 
Nietzsche, this essay maintains is true of Nietzsche throughout his mature philosophical career, 
most notably in the masterworks of the mid-1880’s.  
29 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “pity” from the Latin, “pietas,” which originally 
meant only “piety” and came to take on the secondary meaning of “pity” in the late medieval 
period. See http://dictionary.oed.com/.  
30 This should lead us to be deeply suspicious of English-language commentators who insist that, 
while Nietzsche adamantly rejects “pity,” he is not necessarily opposed to “compassion;” 
Randall Havas, for example, occasionally makes claims along these lines. See Randall Havas, 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy: Nihilism and the Will to Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1995), p. 215, p. 222. I would like to thank Molly Loberg for reconfirming my less-than-
perfect understanding of the subtle connotations of particular German terms. 
31 Although Mitleid is almost always rendered as “pity” in English translations of Nietzsche, in 
the standard English translations Schopenhauer of by E. F. J. Payne the same term is almost 
always translated as “compassion.” (See, e.g., Schopenhauer, On the Basis of Morality [1839]. 
Translated by E. F. J. Payne [Providence, RI: Berghan Books, 1995].) It makes an important 
difference whether we see the dispute between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer over Mitleids-Moral 
as a debate over (as most translators of Nietzsche would have it) “the morality of pity” or (as 
Schopenhauer’s translator Payne would have it) “the morality of compassion.”  
32 David Cartwright observes that Nietzsche’s conception of compassion as a contagion has its 
inspiration in Kant, as do several of his more specific arguments regarding the sentiment 
discussed in this section; see David E. Cartwright, “Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on the 
Morality of Pity,” Journal of the History of Ideas. 45:1 (January 1984): 83-98.    
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33 Havas correctly rejects any reading of Nietzsche on compassion which interprets his position 
“as though pity were, in his view, merely one vice among many” (Havas, p. 211). Havas chides 
Richard Schacht for putting forward such an interpretation, though this seems to be an unduly 
harsh reading of Schacht; see Richard Schacht, Nietzsche (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1983), especially pp. 359-362, p. 461. 
34 Martha Nussbaum, highlighting her observation of Nietzsche’s undeniable debt to the ancient 
Stoics on this point, places this line of thought at the heart of Nietzsche’s opposition to 
compassion. See Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, Ch. 7, esp. pp. 384-385, as well as the essay 
in Schacht, ed. Stanley Rosen concurs, arguing that, for Nietzsche, pity is “the true form of 
heartlessness” because it “tolerates sickness and cowardice” (Rosen, p. 105). This argument is 
also discussed in Havas, p. 214. Nussbaum’s primary error in her interpretation of Nietzsche, one 
not shared by Rosen, is that she puts far too great an emphasis on this Stoic line of argument 
alone. M. Weber has convincingly argued that “insofar as Nussbaum tries to bring Nietzsche into 
the Stoic fold, she misses or misconstrues much of what he has to say.” While it is true that 
“there are surely traces of Stoicism to be found in Nietzsche… this should not lead us to interpret 
all he says in Stoic terms.” See M. Weber, “Compassion and Pity: An Evaluation of Nussbaum’s 
Analysis and Defense,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (2004): 487-511, p. 507. 
35 This eugenic argument is emphasized in Tracy Strong’s brief discussion of Nietzsche on “pity” 
in Tracy B. Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration. Expanded Edition 
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1975/2000). “Pity,” Strong writes, “is thus a form of the 
will to power engendering, and characterizing, nihilism: it preserves that which is characteristic 
of nihilism” (p. 254).    
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36  This is Nietzsche’s own hermeneutic principle: “‘Je ne méprise presque rien,’ [‘I despise 
almost nothing’] he [the objective, scientific spirit] says with Leibniz,” Nietzsche writes. “One 
should not overlook and underestimate that presque” (JGB VI:207, p. 318). 
37 The quoted passages show the error of Lesley Chamberlain’s claim, “There is no pity in the 
world of Dionysus,” at least if “pity” is presented (as Chamberlain herself presents it) as a 
translation of Nietzsche’s Mitleid or Mitledigkeit. See Lesley Chamberlain, Nietzsche in Turin: 
An Intimate Biography (New York: Picador USA, 1996), pp. 103-104. Despite this error, 
Chamberlain does not read Nietzsche as a straightforward critic of compassion; see, e.g., p. 179. 
38 This idea that “pity” leads to “epistemological confusion”—and in its presumptive claim to 
know another’s suffering actually acts against real knowledge of the suffering other—is at the 
heart of Randall Havas’ interpretation of Nietzsche on the subject. See Havas, esp. pp. 220-223. 
39 See, for example, Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 14. 
40 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education (1762). Introduction, Translation and Notes by 
Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 222. 
41 Staten, pp. 154-155. 
42 Strangely, Havas reads this passage as further evidence that, for Nietzsche, “pity” is opposed 
to real knowledge; see Havas, p. 233. Havas associates “pity” with the avoidance of intercourse 
with one’s fellows, while Nietzsche here clearly does the opposite. This passage explicitly 
describes sympathy (Mitgefühl) as the price of human interaction and real knowledge of others. 
While Nietzsche here avoids his usual terminology of Mitleid, the feelings shared in this 
experience of Mitgefühl are obviously painful ones, hence qualifying the Mitgefühl as Mitleid.    
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43 As one must so often do when citing Nietzsche, it is important to note that the author of the 
present essay does not share Nietzsche’s misogyny, so painfully evident in this passage. At the 
same time, we must not make too much for interpretive purposes of the misogynistic language 
here, which comes quite naturally to Nietzsche. Surely it does not do much to explain 
Nietzsche’s subtle position on compassion to simply conclude, with Chamberlain, that Nietzsche 
“allowed himself to accept pity in the male” (Chamberlain, p. 117). 
44 This reading of the fourth part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra as built around the theme of 
compassion is discussed at length in Rosen’s commentary on the work (See Rosen, pp. 207-244). 
While I agree with much of Rosen’s commentary, it will soon become clear that I depart from 
him decisively on the interpretation of the book’s concluding episode, and hence on Nietzsche’s 
real position on compassion.  
45 Nussbaum in Schacht, ed., p. 139, 152. 
46 Rosen, p. 228, 244. 
47 Robert Pippin, “Irony and Affirmation in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” in Michael 
Allen Gillespie and Tracy B. Strong, eds., Nietzsche’s New Seas: Explorations in Philosophy, 
Aesthetics and Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988): 45-74, p. 64. 
48 Rosen, p. 231. 
49 This is intimately tied to the idea of “‘giving style’ to one’s character” cited previously (FW 
4:290, p. 232). 
50 Leslie Paul Thiele, one of the few commentators to notice that Nietzsche “did not desire the 
extirpation of fellow-feeling, but the vanquishing of its decadent form” describes the form of 
compassion which Nietzsche endorses as “a form of compassion which uses suffering as a means 
to the elevation of man… Love must be strong enough to carry out its harsh task in the    
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transformation of suffering, for only then will its compassion not be an aid and abetment to 
cowardice and stagnation” (Thiele, p. 152). Unfortunately, Thiele does not develop his insights 
on the matter much beyond the passages quoted. 
51 More specifically, Nussbaum treats Nietzsche as part of a larger tradition of anti-
compassionate thinkers who “defend a substantive and highly controversial ethical position” 
which very few today would “actually be prepared to endorse” but which “can clear the ground 
for a more adequate contemporary approach” to compassion in politics (Upheavals of Thought, 
p. 356). 
52 Weber, p. 510. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Pippin, p. 65. 
55 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
56 Rosen concurs with this view, writing that “Zarathustra is the highest and purest aspect of 
Nietzsche’s spirit; he stands for what Nietzsche would wish himself to be but cannot become.” 
Given his conventional interpretation of Zarathustra’s ultimate triumph, however, Rosen goes on 
to claim (incorrectly, in my view) that Zarathustra is a better Nietzschean than Nietzsche himself, 
not because Zarathustra is able to affirm his sympathetic sentiments while Nietzsche is not, but 
because “Nietzsche is still bound to the domain and decadence and death by the feeling of pity” 
(Rosen, p. 218). Leslie Paul Thiele’s view on the matter is, despite his real insight into 
Nietzsche’s qualified endorsement of compassion, surprisingly similar to Rosen’s. “The final 
victory over pity of the protagonist of Thus Spoke Zarathustra,” Thiele writes, “would appear not 
to have been granted to its author” (Thiele, p. 153).    
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57 Letter of July 1883 to Malwida von Meysenberg, Quoted and Translated in Rüdiger Safranski, 
Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography. Translated by Shelley Frisch. (New York: W. W. Norton, 
2000/2002), p. 167. A particularly pathetic letter from the winter of 1882, cited by Nietzsce’s 
English-language biographer Curtis Cate, finds the philosopher complaining to Lou Salomé and 
Paul Rée of “a dreadful compassion… [H]ow can I endure it any longer? Is not compassion a 
feeling out of hell? What should I do? Every morning I despair of lasting out the day… Whence 
come these fierce emotions... This evening I will take so much opium that I will lose my reason; 
where is there a h[uman] b[eing] one could still revere?” (Cited and translated in Curtis Cate, 
Friedrich Nietzsche [London: Hutchinson, 2002], p. 389.) See also the larger discussion by 
Safranski of the place of pity in Nietzsche’s own psyche (Safranski, pp. 166-168) and the similar 
discussions by Lesley Chamberlain (Chamberlain, pp. 104-105, 156, 172).  
58 See, e.g., Safranski, p. 316; Chamberlain, pp. 208-210; Cate, p. 550. As Curtis Cate observes, 
the incident of Nietzsche throwing his arms around a beaten horse at the moment of his collapse 
in Turin was first reported in an Italian newspaper thirteen years after the incident in question, 
but it is now included in most biographies of the philosopher (Cate, p. 550). For a thorough 
review of the various available accounts of the incident see Anacleto Verrechia, La catastrophe 
di Nietzsche a Torino (Turin: Einaudi, 1978), especially pp. 207-210. As the anonymous 
reviewers of this essay correctly pointed out, it would be overly reductive to attribute Nietzsche’s 
collapse to unbearable compassion alone; more mundane medical factors obviously played an 
important role. Leslie Paul Thiele concludes that while we must resist the temptation “to suggest 
that pity (for an animal) proved to be Nietzsche’s ultimate undoing” it is still the case that the 
“symbolism” of this incident “is too striking to be discounted” (Thiele, p. 153). 
59 Ruth Abbey has also made this point; see Abbey, pp. 61-63. 